On Wednesday, former President Donald Trump was projected to retake the White House and become the United States’ 47th president. The Senate is also projected to be Republican controlled; the House of Representatives remains too close to call.

Based on insights from his first administration and his campaign promises, the following are a few key areas where U.S. trade policy may change substantively:

  • Increased tariffs: On the campaign trail, Trump pledged to impose a 10–20% baseline tariff on all foreign-made products and tariffs of 60% or more on Chinese-origin imports. He also suggested additional tariffs on companies that move manufacturing from the U.S. to Mexico. Insiders indicate new tariffs will likely be a key priority for the first 100 days of Trump’s second term. At the center of these policies will be former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer who oversaw the retaliatory tariffs imposed in Trump’s first administration. If Republicans takes control of the House, they may also attempt to pass the Trump Reciprocal Trade Act, which would impose reciprocal, equivalent tariffs on goods from any country that tariffs U.S.-origin products. Consistent with the USTR’s report on the existing Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-origin goods, U.S. importers will likely bear the entire cost of any new tariffs.
  • Increased duties on Chinese imports: In addition to tariffs, the Republican party platform calls for revoking China’s Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status (also known as Most Favored Nation status). Trump could suspend China’s NTR status through executive action, which would trigger import duties on Chinese-origin products that are two to 10 times higher than imports from other countries. Currently, only imports from Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, and Russia are subject to these higher duty rates.
  • Renegotiation of the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA): Despite negotiating the USMCA during his first administration, Trump signaled last month that, upon taking office, he would formally notify Mexico and Canada of his intention to invoke the USMCA’s six-year review provision. The joint review would occur in July 2026, and a report will be due to Congress at least 180 days in advance.

A new Trump administration is also likely to continue or increase the government focus on the following U.S. trade policy areas:

  • Continued use of economic sanctions as a key foreign policy tool: Sanctions were a significant tool for both the Trump and Biden administrations. Trump used sanctions as a tool to exert maximum pressure against U.S. adversaries, including China, Iran, and Venezuela. The Biden administration took a similar approach, with a focus on Russia and coordinating global actions to maximize impact. Trump is expected to continue using economic sanctions as a key foreign policy tool.
  • Increased scrutiny of foreign investments: Under Trump’s first administration, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) gained broader authority with the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have emphasized heightened scrutiny of foreign investments, particularly from China. Biden expanded the CFIUS framework with increased enforcement, higher penalties, expanded real estate jurisdiction, and a focus on emphasizing economic security, critical supply chains, sensitive data, and sectors such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence (AI). A renewed Trump administration would likely intensify these measures and concentrate on critical infrastructure and limiting Chinese investment in U.S. real estate and businesses.
  • Continued focus on outbound investment: Biden issued an executive order banning U.S. investment in China for certain “national security technologies,” including certain semiconductors, microelectronics, quantum information, and AI. On October 28, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued its long-awaited final rule, implementing the outbound investment security program, effective January 2, 2025. Trump is expected to continue and possibly expand this focus.
  • Expanded export controls on China: During Trump’s first term, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) was aggressive in restricting exports to China, placing several high-profile Chinese companies and affiliates on the Entity List to limit their access to critical U.S. technology. Under Biden, BIS expanded these restrictions, with a particular focus on semiconductors, AI, and biotechnology. BIS’s enforcement efforts were also increased to ensure compliance. In a new Trump administration, BIS would likely intensify these measures, expanding export controls on emerging technologies, particularly in fields such as quantum computing and cybersecurity. The focus would likely be on further restricting access to sensitive U.S. technologies by foreign adversaries, with a continued emphasis on China and other national security threats.
  • Increased focus on cybersecurity: During Trump’s first administration, the Department of Defense (DoD) implemented restrictions on companies linked to foreign adversaries to safeguard the defense supply chain, including limits on DoD contracts with firms using equipment from entities deemed national security risks. The administration also increased cross-agency coordination, prioritized the establishment of the Space Force, and strengthened cybersecurity measures. A new Trump administration is likely to continue emphasizing restrictions on foreign influence in the defense sector, with a likely renewed focus on cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, space, and advanced technologies such as AI and 5G.
  • Continued focus on emerging technology: Under Trump, the Department of State Directorate of the Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) tightened defense export controls, particularly to China and other adversaries, while streamlining licensing processes. The administration emphasized protecting sensitive technology and enhancing oversight of end-users. Under Biden, DDTC continued these policies with a greater focus on human rights, international coordination, and increased scrutiny of exports to China and Russia. Under a new Trump administration, DDTC would likely continue its focus on tightening defense exports to adversaries, particularly in emerging technologies such as AI and quantum computing, while aiming to reduce regulatory barriers for U.S. defense contractors.
  • Continued prioritization of export control enforcement: Since U.S. export control laws are premised on national security, enforcement for non-compliance is typically a priority for any administration. The first Trump administration entered into several settlement agreements related to the unauthorized export of controlled items, technology, and services. Enforcement of these laws will likely continue to be a priority. The Biden administration also relied on foreign direct product rules and the Entity List to restrict access to U.S. export-controlled products and technology by parties believed to pose a risk to U.S. national security and foreign policy. While not used as frequently during the first Trump administration, the Entity List was used to designate Chinese entities and it will likely be used again to advance U.S. foreign policy interests during the upcoming administration.

If Republicans regain control of both houses of Congress, Trump will have latitude to pass new laws that align with his trade and foreign policy agendas. Two key legislative proposals to monitor include:

  • The Countering Communist China Act (CCCA), which was introduced by Republican members of Congress in February 2024. The CCCA is a wide-ranging bill that would, among other things, introduce restrictions on outbound investments in Chinese technology companies and trade restrictions on Chinese military and surveillance companies.  
  • Senate Bill 3945, which Senator Vance introduced in March 2024 to restrict the Chinese government’s access to U.S. capital markets and exchanges if it fails to comply with certain international laws.