Diss-cussing Defamation:  

Creative Expression, Feuds, & Cross Words Across Borders 

By James P. Flynn, Epstein Becker Green 

The legal intersection of music, poetry, and defamation presents a fascinating landscape where creativity collides with reputational interests. The recent decision in Graham v. UMG Recordings, Inc.—filed by Canadian rapper Aubrey “Drake” Graham over the diss track Not Like Us by Kendrick Lamar, a rapper who grew up in Compton, California—offers a contemporary lens on this tension. Yet, the legal questions it raises resonate globally, from India to the United Kingdom to the US, illustrating both the universality and jurisdiction-specific nuances of evaluating artistic speech in the defamation context. 

What is a diss track? 

My sense is that many of us have heard this term, and probably have heard specifically about the diss tracks in this feud between Drake and Kendrick Lamar.  Indeed, some of us are old enough to remember the earlier, more innocent times when Carly Simon’s You’re So Vain was considered a diss track of sorts, albeit with targets of disparagement that were a bit more ambiguous. But, in short, as one resource summarizes it, the definition of such a track is: 

A diss track, diss record or diss song (an abbreviation of disrespect or disparage) is a track that verbally attacks someone, usually another artist. Diss tracks are often the result of an existing, escalating feud between the two people; for example, the artists involved may be former members of a group, or artists on rival labels. 

The diss track as a medium of its own was popularized within the hip-hop genre, fueled by the hip-hop rivalry phenomenon (especially the East Coast–West Coast hip-hop rivalry of the mid-1990s). More recently, entertainers from outside the traditional music landscape have adopted the genre. […] Though the term “diss track” originated in hip-hop, there are many examples throughout music history of earlier songs written as attacks on specific individuals. Some have also been retroactively described as diss tracks in their own right. 

That same resource, and others, take that history of diss tracks, at least in the US, from the present rap era all the way back to Yankee Doodle Dandy, a song “already well known by the 1750s” and “that in 1755 [was one for which] a British doctor named Richard Schuckburg penned new words to mock his American allies,” making it a proverbial “Colonial Insult.”  See Yankee Doodle: The story behind the song.  Outside of the U.S., some would take such rap music back to the trouble songs of the medieval troubadours and the mocking songs (Cantigas de escárnio e maldizer) that M. Ana de Guzmán has described as among the “The Disses and Rap Battles of the 13^th Century Iberian Peninsula.”  This world history goes still further back to Five Ancient Forms of Diss Track, reaching all the way through the English and Scottish flyting (“a form of highly poetic abuse”) of the Dark and Middle Ages to Anglo-Saxon bēots to Greek and Latin insult poetry and even earlier to the traded barbs among Mesopotamian scribes in training in ancient Sumer, who were among “[s]ome of the first people to write stuff down.” 

Though all of great interest, we leave these extended histories to your independent reading pleasure as we fast forward to today: 

Graham v. UMG: A U.S. Perspective 

1. Background 

Drake, a leading figure in the music industry, has been associated with Universal Music Group for over 20 years. UMG provides artists like Drake with the necessary tools and platforms to produce, market, and sell their music. The company, via its subsidiary Universal Music Publishing Group, exclusively controls the rights to publish and distribute the works of Drake and Kendrick Lamar. 

Lamar and Drake entered into a “feud,” going back and forth through “diss tracks.”   

On April 19, 2024, Drake released a diss track directed at Kendrick Lamar called Push Ups. In Push Ups, Drake’s lyrics mock Lamar’s height and shoe size, (“How the f*** you big steppin’ with a size-seven men’s on/. . . Pipsqueak, pipe down”), and questions Lamar’s success, id. (“You ain’t in no big three/. . . I’m at the top of the mountain, so you tight now/Just to have this talk with your a**, I had to hike down.”).  A few days later, Drake released Taylor Made Freestyle, in which he used artificial intelligence-generated voices of deceased rapper 2Pac and of rapper Snoop Dogg to goad Lamar. In the track, “2Pac” and “Snoop Dogg” share their disappointment that Lamar had not yet responded to “Push Ups.” (“Kendrick, we need ya, the West Coast savior/. . . You seem a little nervous about all the publicity/. . . you gotta show this f***in’ owl who’s boss on the West.”). Drake, in his own voice, further taunts Kendrick for failing to come up with a satisfactory response, saying, “I know you’re in that NY apartment, you strugglin’ right now, I know it/In the notepad doing lyrical gymnastics, my boy.” Drake also surmises that Kendrick was purposefully delaying his response because artist Taylor Swift had just released a new album. (“[S]hout out to Taylor Swift/Biggest gangster in the music game right now/. . . She got the whole pgLang on mute like that Beyoncé challenge, y’all boys quiet for the weekend.”). 

Lamar responded to Drake in Euphoria, which was released on April 30, 2024. In the track, Lamar claims, “I make music that electrify ‘em, you make music that pacify ‘em” and that he would “spare [Drake] this time, that’s random acts of kindness.” He accuses Drake of lying: “Know you a master manipulator and habitual liar too/But don’t tell no lie about me and I won’t tell truths ‘bout you.” He insults Drake’s fashion sense (“I hate the way that you walk, the way that you talk, I hate the way that you dress”), further raps “I believe you don’t like women, it’s real competition, you might pop a** with ‘em,” and taunts Drake for being a coward with his responses (“I hate the way that you sneak diss, if I catch flight, it’s gon’ be direct.”). 

On May 3, 2024, the feud between Drake and Lamar escalated again, as they increased the personal accusations at each other over the course of the day. First, Lamar released 6:16 in LA, in which he calls Drake a “terrible person” and accuses Drake of “playin’ dirty with propaganda.” Drake’s next response arrived later that day in Family Matters. Drake jabs at Lamar’s relationship with his partner (“You the Black messiah wifin’ up a mixed queen/And hit vanilla cream to help out with your self-esteem/On some Bobby sh**, I wanna know what Whitney need”) and implies that Lamar physically abused her, (“Your baby mama captions always screamin’, ‘Save me’/You did her dirty all your life, you tryna make peace.”). Moreover, Drake calls into question whether Lamar is the biological father of one of his children. (“I heard that one of ‘em little kids might be Dave Free/Don’t make it Dave Free’s”).  Almost immediately after the release of “Family Matters,” Lamar unleashed the scathing Meet the Grahams, in which he accuses Drake of being a “deadbeat” father and of hiding the existence of other children. (“You lied about your son, you lied about your daughter, huh/You lied about them other kids that’s out there hopin’ that you come.”). Lamar also alleges that Drake has “gamblin’ problems, drinkin’ problems, pill-poppin’ and spendin’ problems/Bad with money, wh***house/Solicitin’ women problems, therapy’s a lovely start.” He further insinuates that Drake was a “predator” and that Drake “should die so all of these women can live with a purpose.”  

The next day, on May 4, 2024, Lamar released Not Like Us. Not Like Us explicitly names Drake and his associates as pedophiles. Id. Specifically, the track contains the following lyrics: 

Say, Drake, I hear you like ‘em young  
You better not ever go to cell block one  

To any b**** that talk to him and they in love 

Just make sure you hide your lil’ sister from him… 

Certified Lover Boy? Certified pedophiles… 

Why you trollin’ like a b****? Ain’t you tired?  
Tryna strike a chord and it’s probably A-Minor 

On May 5, 2024, Drake responded in The Heart Part 6, directly denying Lamar’s allegations of pedophilia (“I never been with no one underage, …/If I was f***ing young girls, I promise I’d have been arrested/I’m way too famous for this s*** you just suggested/. . . Drake is not a name that you gon’ see on no sex offender list.”). In the track, Drake further sneers that “[t]his Epstein angle was the s*** I expected” and accused Lamar of wanting to “misdirect.” Drake also alleges that he had planted some of the information Lamar has used against him. (“We plotted for a week, and then we fed you the information/. . . But you so thirsty, you not concerned with investigation/. . . You gotta learn to fact-check things and be less impatient.”).  

It is important to note that Drake may have later  moved to the legal forum since Not Like Us appeared to be a commercial knockout punch (which “broke the record for most single-day Spotify streams for a hip-hop song in the US,” as one source noted) in the rap feud that the Heart Part 6 (which didn’t come close to as many views) just didn’t match up against: 

Not Like Us, which was released in May 2024, was widely seen as the decisive blow in an ongoing battle between the rival rappers. 

It has become the biggest hit of Lamar’s career, having won five Grammys and being one of the most-talked about moments of his Super Bowl half-time show in February. 

[Saad & Savage, Drake’s lawsuit over Kendrick Lamar diss track is dismissed, BBC] 

In sum, Drake filed suit alleging that Lamar’s lyrics defamed him by falsely suggesting criminal sexual misconduct, and that UMG amplified this harm through promotional activities. Drake’s lawsuit, filed in January 2025, accused UMG of defamation, harassment, and deceptive business practices under New York law. He contended that the lyrics of Not Like Us, which included phrases such as “certified pedophile” and “neighborhood watch,” were false and defamatory. Drake further alleged that UMG had promoted the song through deceptive means, including artificial inflation of its popularity, thereby amplifying the reputational damage. 

2. Court Decision 

Unfortunately, Drake suffered a similar knockout blow in court.  Judge Jeannette A. Vargas dismissed the lawsuit, holding that the lyrics constituted nonactionable opinion rather than statements of fact. The court emphasized the context of a rap feud, where hyperbolic and exaggerated language is expected, concluding that no reasonable listener would interpret the lyrics as literal assertions of fact.  

The Graham opinion emphasized several key points: 

• Context of Artistic Expression: The song was released during a highly publicized rap feud between Drake and Lamar, characterized by exaggerated and hyperbolic language. (I would add that a feud has its own Wikipedia page).  The court noted that “diss tracks” are a recognized form of artistic expression within the hip-hop community, often employing rhetorical devices to disparage or attack another person or group and that are not meant to be taken literally. 

• Audience Interpretation: The judge determined that a reasonable listener would not interpret the lyrics as factual assertions but rather as part of the artistic hyperbole typical of rap battles. 

• Precedent Cases: The court referenced previous decisions, such as Steinhilber v. Alphonse and Torain v. Liu, which protected heated insults in public feuds as non-factual opinion, and Rapaport v. Barstool Sports, where a defamation claim over a diss track was dismissed (and that dismissal affirmed) for similar reasons. 

The Graham court relied on precedent protecting expressive, rhetorical statements in public disputes, reinforcing the principle that artistic hyperbole enjoys robust First Amendment protection. Importantly, the ruling was procedural: a 12(b)(6) dismissal assessing the plausibility of a claim, not the ultimate truth or falsity of any factual allegation. 

Comparative U.S. Cases 

Graham’s reasoning fits among other, earlier U.S. cases addressing songs and poems:   

1. In Parks v. LaFace Records (the Rosa Parks song), the Sixth Circuit held in 2003 that the song did not make verifiable statements of fact about Rosa Parks, and therefore her defamation claim failed. The court underscored the necessity of a false factual assertion “of and concerning” the plaintiff. The parties ultimately settled in 2005 on undisclosed terms.  To understand Parks, one must understand that, although she was a very sympathetic plaintiff, the constitutional imperatives of the 1^st Amendment not only overwhelmed the defamation and false light claims, but also led the Court to reject publicity and trademark claims as well in favor of further bolstering the claims of creative license.   

2. Fisher v. Dees involved a parody of the song When Sunny Gets Blue, where the Ninth Circuit similarly found that the parody could not reasonably be interpreted as defamatory. The court reinforced that comedic exaggeration and parody fall within constitutionally protected expression. As in Parks, the Fisher court also rejected non-defamation claims, which in Fisher amounted to copyright and related claims compared to the trademark claims in Parks. 

3. Freedlander v. Edens Broadcasting, Inc. provides an illustrative case where plaintiffs alleged defamation from a song broadcasting purportedly false statements implying criminal activity. Emphasizing the protections afforded comedy, which we have discussed here before as well, the court noted that the context as much as the content precluded the possibility of defamation: “it is impossible to believe that a reader would have perceived the song to be anything else than irrelevant and irreverent social commentary.”  

Each of these earlier U.S. cases suggested the outcome seen in Graham. 

An International Comparison: India 

On previous occasions, we have drawn lessons from, or followed developments in, India to illustrate how these issues play out beyond U.S. borders.  We did it in a piece concerning deep fakes and elections, and in another concerning satire and humor as defenses to legal claims (where we cited the Indian High Court at Delhi in Tata Sons Limited vs Greenpeace International & Anr on 28 January 2011 (para. 24, 41-43)).  We also did it when discussing copyrighting functional objects, and extensively when discussing whether one can acquire individual intellectual property rights in holy names, sacred words, and other aspects of creation.  Probably did it on other topics as well, but these examples suffice to illustrate the many ways that a comparative law analysis can deepen our understanding, wherever we sit. 

Now we look to India in this piece concerning whether non-copyright legal liability can arise from a poem or song. 

The Indian Supreme Court has confronted analogous tensions in the Judgment in Imran Pratapgarhi, Criminal Appeal No.1545 of 2025, where a Congress MP and poet shared a poem with an accompanying video-ed song clip.  

Complaints led to a First Information Report (or FIR) being filed alleging public order offences.  Essentially, somebody filed charges at Jamnagar Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNS’), alleging that the posted video of a recited poem incited disorder because “the spoken words of the poem incite people of one community against another, and it hurts a community’s religious and social sentiments. It is alleged that the song had lyrics that incited people of other communities to fight for the community’s rights. It is alleged that the video posted by the appellant created enmity between two communities at the national level and hatred towards each other. It was further alleged that it had a detrimental effect on national unity.”  Pratapgarhi Judgment at 3. According to the charging party, the video-ed poetry reading posted on X  was one “using provocative language about the religion, caste and language of Hindus, Muslims and other castes living in India, promoting enmity between different groups, making statements that are detrimental to national unity, making statements that are harmful to national unity, making statements with the intention of hurting religious feelings, making religious insults, spreading the video among the people with the intention of causing shock, inciting others to commit a crime.” Pratapgarhi Judgment at 9. 

The charged party claimed that the recited verse did nothing of the sort, but that on “a plain reading of the song poem, it is a message of love and non-violence….[I]t is about sacrificing oneself to fight for rights and truth. The poem promotes non-violence and preaches that one must suffer injustice with love.” Pratapgarhi Judgment at 4-5.  As the Court noted, of the poem that had been recited in Urdu, that: 

A broad English translation of the said poem reads thus:  

“Those who are blood thirsty, listen to us  

If the fight for our rights is met with injustice  

We will meet that injustice with love  

If the drops flowing from a candle are like a flame (Analogy: if the tears from our face are like a flame)  

We will use it to light up all paths 

If the bodies of our loved ones are a threat to your throne  

We swear by God that we will bury our loved ones happily  

Those who are blood thirsty, listen to us.” 

[Pratapgarhi Judgment at 6-7] 

The Indian Court agreed with the charged party’s reading, and so ruled in a March 28, 2025 opinion. Pratapgarhi Judgment at 7-8.   

Indeed, on that basis, the Court quashed the FIR, emphasizing the constitutional protection of artistic and related expression. In fact, those protections are so strong that, according to the Indian Court, even though such protected expressions are marked by “[s]ome extravagance of language” and “the usual crude emotional appeal which is the stock and trade of the demagogue, as well as a blundering and ineffective attempt to ape the poets.” Pratapgarhi Judgment at 32.  Because “[l]iterature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful,” Pratapgarhi Judgment at 43, “Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. . . [and] to protect and promote the fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech and expression, . . .[and] must remain ever vigilant to thwart any attempt to undermine the Constitution and the constitutional values, including the freedom of speech and expression.” Pratapgarhi Judgment at 44.   

Though this is more of a fighting-words-type case than a defamation one, this Indian decision rests, like Graham, on a notion of the freedom that an artist must have to express perspective, regardless of whether it may be unpopular with many or simply a single person arguably defamed: 

The right of the playwright, of the artist, writer and of the poet will be reduced to husk if the freedom to portray a message – whether it be in canvas, prose or verse – is to depend upon the popular perception of the acceptability of that message. Popular perceptions, however strong cannot override values which the constitution embodies as guarantees of freedom in what was always intended to be a free society.” 

[Pratapgarhi Judgment at 46] 

The Indian Court ended its analysis by noting that “75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society.”  It is worth noting that four days before this ruling, a “mob violently ransacked a Mumbai comedy club and its building has been partly demolished after one of India’s most prominent comedians performed a satirical song about a local ruling politician during a performance there.” So, one can conclude that this Court stood strong for free speech in the moment. As the U.S. approaches its semiquincentennial, one only hopes its appellate courts will remain as unshakeable as its younger democratic siblings in defense of protected expression, especially as important lower court on that score are examined. See, e.g., here. 

Other OUS Examples 

Indeed, looking quickly beyond the Indian example, here is a chart of some further OUS matters and considerations: 

Jurisdiction / Source	Case / Doctrine	Key Facts / Issue	How Court Treated Artistic / Expressive Speech	Key Holding or Principle	Relevance / Caveats
UK / historic	Whitehouse v Gay News Ltd, [1979] AC 617, HL	A poem published in Gay News (explicit, provocative) was prosecuted under blasphemy laws	The court treated the poem as criminally libelous/blasphemous, not as a defamation suit by a private individual	The publishers were convicted under blasphemy law for “blasphemous libel” (not “defamation of a person”).	Not a civil defamation case; shows that expressive works can be prosecuted under non-defamation statutes (religious blasphemy) in some jurisdictions.
Canada (commentary)	“Expert insight: What does the law say about defamatory lyrics?” (Western News / Western University)	Discussion of rap feuds (e.g. Drake / Lamar)	Recognizes that lyrics can be the subject of libel claims; but emphasizes the high threshold and contextual defenses	Musical lyrics and audio recordings can qualify as libel (in theory), but defenses like opinion, hyperbole, context weigh heavily.	This is commentary, not binding law; shows academic/legal awareness in Canada.
Australia	“Protest Music and the Law” (ArtsLaw)	Guidance on whether songs (lyrics) may be defamatory under Australian law	Treats lyrics like statements: they can be sued over, but must satisfy the same defamation elements	All the usual defamation elements/defenses apply (e.g. truth, contextual meaning, etc.).	That is a legal guide, not a court judgment; Australia has had some modern defamation cases involving expressive media, but I didn’t find a high-profile case in which a court definitively held a lyric or poem defamatory.
UK / Canada (comparative)	“The Libel Bible: comparison Canada / UK” (Lexology)	Surveys defamation law frameworks in UK & Canada	Explains that in both jurisdictions, one must show “defamatory statement,” identification, publication etc., and also describes available defenses (e.g. truth, honest opinion)	In UK (post-Defamation Act 2013) there is a “serious harm” threshold. In Canada, falsity/damages are presumed once defamation is established, shifting burden to defendant.	This article does not focus specifically on songs/poems, but gives the legal landscape in which claims would be assessed in those jurisdictions.

Now let’s turn to a comparison of the reasoning across jurisdictions. 

Cross-Jurisdictional Insights 

Below is a side-by-side comparison highlighting alignments, differences, and tensions between Graham and the non-U.S. material: 

Feature	Graham v. UMG (U.S., Judge Vargas)	Comparative Non-U.S. / Doctrine Material
Baseline approach to expressive works	The court begins from the idea that lyrics in rap feuds are likely to be viewed as rhetorical, not literal. The question is whether a reasonable listener would treat the statement as fact.	Classic in UK/Common Law jurisdictions: similarly, courts and commentators emphasize whether a statement is reasonably interpretable as factual, with recognition that creative works often use figurative language.
Role of context	Central. The court repeatedly cites genre (diss track), audience expectations, prior lyrics in the feud, tone, and the fact this is part of a back-and-forth musical sparring as factors showing non-literal meaning.	Comparative doctrine also stresses context (medium, audience, expectation, tone) as a critical filter. That is one of the consistent threads across jurisdictions.
Reasonable recipient standard	Yes: “no reasonable listener would view it as verifiable fact” is the linchpin.	In UK/Common Law jurisdictions, courts often ask whether an ordinary person, reading (or hearing) the statement, would infer it as a factual assertion. This notion of “ordinary reader/reasonable person” is common.
Threshold for fact vs opinion	The court treats the line as opinion/hyperbole because of the inherent rhetorical, exaggerated nature of diss tracks, not as a plainly false factual statement.	In comparative jurisdictions, the “honest opinion /fair comment” (UK, Canada) or “expression of opinion” doctrine often parallels U.S. distinction, although statutory forms vary. Because creative works typically include exaggeration, many claims fail on that line.
Procedural posture (dismissal standard)	The case is resolved at the 12(b)(6) motion stage — i.e. the court does not accept factual disputes, but determines that even assuming the plaintiff’s facts, the lyric is nonactionable as a matter of law.	Many comparative cases involving expressive content are resolved early (motions, summary judgment) or not fully litigated, so courts often decide whether the impugned statement could be defamatory. The comparative doctrine includes early dismissals for pure opinion or non-actionable rhetoric.
Statutory/ doctrinal filters	The U.S. First Amendment provides strong protection for expressive speech; the court frames the decision in expressive-liberty terms (i.e. protecting artists).	In various jurisdictions, additional statutory filters or limitations exist (e.g. the UK’s serious harm threshold, in Canada defenses like justification or fair comment; in India, constitutional protections). These can prevent weak claims from proceeding even before a full trial.
Burden of proof /falsity assumption	In U.S. defamation law, the plaintiff must plead falsity (or provide a defamatory statement that is presumed false in some contexts) and must overcome the defense of opinion. Here, Drake’s allegations are considered insufficient to cross that boundary.	In many non-U.S. jurisdictions, once a defamatory statement is found, falsity and damages may be presumed, shifting the burden to the defendant. But prior to that, the threshold question of whether a statement qualifies as “defamatory” or “of fact” is still analyzed.
Expressive medium vs traditional media	The opinion emphasizes that a rap diss track is not like a newspaper article; audience expectations differ. This medium distinction is central to the reasoning.	Comparative doctrine likewise recognizes that different media (artistic works, satire, opinion columns) are read differently from news reporting. Courts are more cautious about treating them as factual pronouncements.
Published decisions affirming lyric defamation	None in this case (the court dismisses). The opinion cites analogous U.S. cases rejecting lyric defamation.	In comparative jurisdictions, no clear published judgments found holding that a song lyric or poem was itself defamatory. The doctrine suggests that many such claims would fail, for the same reasons (context, audience expectations, rhetorical nature).
Limitations/ uncertainties	Because Graham is decided on a motion to dismiss, factual disputes about how listeners interpreted the lyrics are not explored in depth. Also, the opinion is U.S.-centric; First Amendment framework creates potentially unique substantive overtones.	Comparative doctrine sometimes lacks case law in exactly analogous settings; some jurisdictions impose statutory filters or higher procedural gates (e.g. “serious harm” in UK). Also, differences in burden and defamation law structure may change incentives.  But certainly see the Indian example above, which illustrates the impact of constitutional imperatives OUS.

Thus, when comparing Graham v. UMG to the international and earlier U.S. cases, note well that: 

• Context Matters: Across jurisdictions, courts analyze the medium, genre, and audience expectations. Diss tracks, parody songs, and poems with hyperbolic content are consistently treated as unlikely to constitute verifiable fact. 

• Thresholds for Defamation: The U.S. requires a false statement of fact; India emphasizes freedom of expression in creative works; the Rosa Parks and Fisher v. Dees cases show U.S. courts reject claims that rely on metaphorical or comedic statements. 

• Audience Interpretation: Courts consider how a reasonable listener or reader would interpret the statement, with artistic forms often entitled to greater leeway. 

• Procedural Stage: Dismissals on motions to dismiss or early-stage quashing, as in Graham or Pratapgarhi, are common, reflecting courts’ reluctance to let speculative claims impede artistic expression. 

These comparisons illustrate that, much like in the U.S., the threshold for actionable defamation in artistic works is high. Courts weigh context, audience perception, and the expressive nature of the work, often erring on the side of free expression. 

With that comparison in mind, we can now conclude. 

Conclusion 

Graham v. UMG underscores a recurring principle: artistic expression, whether in song, parody, or poetry, enjoys a high degree of legal protection. International examples from India and elsewhere, and prior U.S. cases, demonstrate a shared judicial recognition that exaggeration, hyperbole, and satire are not inherently defamatory. (Though it probably remains a bit of a stretch to suggest that they are non-defamatory inherently).  

For creators, Graham and these other cases reaffirm that, while reputational harm is a legitimate concern, courts consistently require concrete, false factual statements uttered in a context suggesting an actual report of real events before permitting defamation claims to proceed. As the global landscape of music and media evolves, understanding these thresholds is crucial for artists, publishers, and legal practitioners navigating the delicate interface between creativity and the law.