The so-called “battle of seats” in international arbitration isn’t new, spanning over half a century. Various global capitals have developed favorable legal ecosystems—either through enacting legislation ensuring legal certainty or issuing court decisions viewed as favorable towards arbitration. This competition has helped to position arbitration as the preferred mechanism for resolving cross-border disputes.[1] The “rivalry” between London and Paris as arbitration seats is particularly noteworthy and has been put in display in cases where their courts have taken opposing approaches on the same issues. The fact that two of the world’s leading arbitration institutions –the LCIA and the ICC– are headquartered in London and Paris respectively further fuel this sustained competition.
Recent statistics and surveys confirm this phenomenon: Paris and London have long led the fight for the top two global spots as the most frequently chosen arbitral seats[2] according to the ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics, with London claiming first place in certain years and Paris claiming the same in other years.[3] Similar results were reported in the 2024 International Arbitration Survey, which showed that London and Paris remain the preferred seats worldwide across virtually all regions.[4]
Domestic courts, drawing on their respective legal traditions, have also contributed to this “battle”. Thus, while French courts have found non-signatories to be bound by the arbitration agreement when being involved in the negotiation, performance and termination of the underlying contract,[5] the English High Court has taken a much more restrictive approach.[6] A similar contrast arises in relation to the recognition of foreign arbitral awards: French courts have recognized awards that were set aside in England, in line with the French conception that an international arbitral award is autonomous and detached from the law of the seat.[7] Their approach to the applicable law to the arbitration agreement also differ as will be explained in detail below.
In the past, competition among arbitral seats drove major structural reforms through new legislation or landmark case law. The recent reform of the English Arbitration Act (the “English Reform”) has taken a more targeted approach.[8] Indeed, rather than undertaking a “root-and-branch reform”, the English Reform relied on stakeholder input to identify particular issues whose resolution would enable efficient and practical arbitration.[9] The result was an open, transparent, and swift process that produced legislation widely regarded as necessary, given London’s continued growth as an arbitral seat and to preserve its attractiveness.[10]
In turn, in the autumn of 2025 France has also launched its proposed reform of arbitration[11] (the “2025 French Reform”), aimed at reaffirming the autonomy of French arbitration law and recognizing its unique character.[12] To this end, the 2025 French Reform sets out strategic objectives focused on promoting a more flexible arbitral regime (with simple and accessible procedural rules), a more protective one (safeguarding the integrity of the proceedings and the weaker party), and a more effective one (by imposing limits on challenges to arbitral awards).[13]
Accordingly, the following sections examine selected elements of the English Reform and the proposals of the 2025 French Reform, focusing on the reasons, principles, and solutions adopted in each system, viewed through the lens of their respective legal philosophies.
1. Applicable law to the arbitration agreement
One of the most significant changes introduced by the English Reform concerns the determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. The Act provides that, in the absence of an express choice by the parties as to the law governing the arbitration agreement, the law of the seat shall apply.[14] The reform abandons the closest connection test adopted in recent English case law, most notably in Enka v. Chubb,[15] an approach that had been subject to criticism due to the uncertainty, cost, and procedural complexity arising from applying foreign law to the arbitration agreement.[16]
This provision departs from French arbitration law, which—since Dalico—treats the arbitration agreement as autonomous from the law of the seat. Under that approach, the applicable law is determined by the parties’ common intention, limited only by French mandatory rules and international public policy.[17]
The 2025 French Reform recommends incorporating these and other principles of French arbitration law into a proposed new arbitration “code,” with the aim of establishing arbitration as an autonomous legal discipline—rather than a branch of civil procedure— further enhancing the visibility and international attractiveness of French arbitration law. This would be achieved by defining the rules that characterize French arbitration law, which constitute “its distinctive mark” and which “allow it to radiate beyond its borders”.[18]
In sum, both England and France look for certainty in their reforms in order to avoid disputes over the law governing the arbitration agreement. England does it by applying a lex-arbitri-based criterion, France does it by referring the matter to the parties’ common intention rather than to domestic law—reinforcing the transnational character of international arbitration under French law.
2. Limiting Jurisdictional Objections
Another innovation introduced by the English Reform concerns the restriction of jurisdictional objections. Under the former English model, consolidated by the case law in Dallah v. Pakistan,[19] courts could conduct a de novo review in jurisdictional challenges, admitting new evidence and new arguments. This often resulted in duplicative proceedings and increased costs.[20] The English Reform narrows this approach by allowing a full rehearing only where the challenging party did not participate in the arbitral proceedings or could not, with reasonable diligence, have known of the ground for challenge.[21] In all other circumstances, the court’s review is confined to the facts and evidence presented before the tribunal, meaning that judicial scrutiny focuses on whether the tribunal correctly applied the law.
The new English approach contrasts with the current situation in France created by the Schooner case,[22] where any objection to jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal enables the applicant to raise new evidence and new arguments during annulment proceedings. This has been criticized as a “disguised appeal” and as an incentive for parties to withhold arguments in the event of an unfavorable award, only to introduce them later at the annulment stage.[23] Precisely for this reason, and with the aim of reversing the situation created by Schooner, the French Reform introduces the principle of procedural loyalty, while preserving the possibility of reopening the discussion —with new evidence and arguments—exclusively in cases involving violations of international public policy.[24]
3. Duty of disclosure of arbitrators
Regarding the duty of disclosure, the English Reform codifies it, reflecting the jurisprudential trend established in Halliburton v. Chubb,[25] which recognizes this obligation as fundamental to ensuring impartiality and independence. The proposal goes further by extending the arbitrator’s duty to disclose not only to what the arbitrator actually knows, but also what the arbitrator “ought reasonably to be aware of”.[26] By incorporating this broader standard, English law aligns more closely with international standards (such as the IBA Guidelines)[27] and with French law as developed through case law.
The English Reform places the entire burden of disclosure on the arbitrator. In contrast, French case law has developed a “duty of curiosity”,[28] requiring the parties to investigate publicly available information and relieving arbitrators from disclosing circumstances that are public or widely known. However, the 2025 French Reform reaffirms the principles of independence and impartiality and reproduces Article 1456 of the Code of Civil Procedure but so far has chosen not to codify the jurisprudence that has developed this “duty of curiosity”.[29]
4. Human arbitrator requirement
The 2025 French Reform introduces a firm and forward-looking position seeking to preserve the human character of arbitration in the era of Artificial Intelligence. This proposal expressly requires that arbitrators deciding cases in France be natural persons with legal capacity, thereby excluding entities such as legal persons (including institutions) and, most notably, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems.[30] This is interesting at a moment when some arbitration institutions such as ICDR have recently launched AI arbitrator initiatives.[31]
This approach anchors French arbitration in personal trust and human judgment, ensuring that functions involving ethics and discretion remain strictly human. Yet the proposal remains pragmatic internationally: it does not bar the recognition or enforcement in France of foreign awards made by legal persons or non-human decision-makers. France thus sets a firm rule for its own seat without obstructing technological developments abroad. By contrast, the English Arbitration Act 2025—targeted and issue-specific—remains silent on this point.
In conclusion, the English and French reforms pursue the same overarching goal—enhancing confidence and effectiveness in arbitration—but through markedly different paths. The English Reform, conceived as a precise and non-disruptive intervention, has been well received by practitioners for providing clear solutions to specific issues without unsettling the balance of the system. The 2025 French Reform, still unfolding, reflects a more ambitious and structural vision aimed at reaffirming the autonomy and distinctive character of French arbitration law. Together, they show that there is no single model for strengthening an arbitral seat but rather approaches shaped by the legal traditions and priorities of each jurisdiction.
[1] White & Case, and Queen Mary University of London. 2025. International Arbitration Survey: The Path Forward: Realities and Opportunities in Arbitration, p. 5.
[2] International Chambers of Commerce (ICC). 2024 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics. Paris: ICC, 2024.
[3] Thus, for example, in the 2023 statistics Paris led with 14.3% (96 cases), followed by London with 12.7% (85 cases), whereas in 2021 London led with 13.5% (94 cases) and Paris followed with 12.8% (89 cases). See: 2024 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics, 2023 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics.
[4] According to the White & Case and Queen Mary University survey, London ranked first in Europe (59%), the Middle East (63%), Africa (60%), and Latin America (48%), while Paris remained in second place, with percentages ranging from 41% to 46% across the same regions.
[5] Dow Chemical Group v. Isover Saint-Gobain, Paris Court of Appeal, 21.10.1983, in Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1984(1), pp. 98-114.
[6] Peterson Farms Inc v C&M Farming Ltd, [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm); Kabab-Ji SAL v Kout Food Group, [2021] UKSC 48; Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46; On appeal from: [2009] EWCA Civ 755.
[7] Cour de cassation (France), 1st Civil Chamber. Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est Epices. Decision No. 06-13.293, 29 June 2007.
[8] Arbitration Act 2025: Practical Implications for Clients Arising From Changes to England’s Arbitration Act: https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/en/insights/publications/2025/03/arbitration-act-2025-practical-implications-for-clients-arising-from-changes-to-englands-arbitration-act.
[9] “We are mindful of the consensus that the Act works well, and that root and branch reform is not needed or wanted. Accordingly, we have confined our recommendations to a few major initiatives, and a very small number of minor corrections” Law Commission. Review of the Arbitration Act 1996: Final Report and Bill. Law Com No. 403. London: The Stationery Office, 2023, para. 1.22.
[10] Jacob Grierson, Peter Rosher, Gisèle Stephens-Chu, ‘La réforme du droit anglais de l’arbitrage’, (2024), 2024, Revue de l’arbitrage, Issue 3, pp. 801-836.
[11] Groupe de travail sur la réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage, sous la co-présidence de François Ancel et Thomas Clay. Rapport et propositions de réforme. Paris : La Documentation française, Mars 2025.
[12] Ibid, p. 5.
[13] Ibid, p. 5-7.
[14] English Arbitration Act 2025, inserting s. 6A into the Arbitration Act 1996.
[15] Enka v. Chubb [2020] UKSC 38.
[16] Law Commission, Review of the Arbitration Act 1996: Second Consultation Paper (March 2023), paras. 2.48–2.62.
[17] Municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v. Société Dalico, Cour de cassation (1re civ.), 20 décembre 1993, Revue de l’arbitrage 1994, 116.
[18] Groupe de travail sur la réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage op. cit, p. 32.
[19] Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, [2011] 1 AC 763.
[20] Law Commission. Review of the Arbitration Act 1996: Final Report and Bill. Law Com No. 403. London: The Stationery Office, 2023, para. 9.14 – 9.19.
[21] English Arbitration Act 2025, s. 11, inserting Arbitration Act 1996, s. 67
[22] “Where jurisdiction has been debated before the arbitrators, the parties are not deprived of the right, in proceedings before the setting-aside court, to raise new grounds and arguments on that issue and, for that purpose, to rely on new items of evidence.” Cour de cassation, 1re civ., Société Schooner et autres c. Société Apple Sales International, 2 décembre 2020, n° 19-15.396, Publié au Bulletin.
[23] “The parties must raise and debate jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal, failing which they are deemed to have waived it; however, they may rely on new grounds and new evidence before the annulment judge in support of that claim. This is exactly the same as an objection to jurisdiction before a state court. The reasoning is appealing. It is nevertheless dangerous. It leads to a slippage of annulment proceedings into an appeal” Jourdan-Marques, Jérémy. “Chronique d’arbitrage: compétence et corruption – le recours en annulation à rude épreuve”, (Dalloz actualité, 2020).
[24] Groupe de travail sur la réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage op. cit, p. 65.
[25] Halliburton Company v. Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48, [2021] AC 191.
[26] Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 (as amended by the Arbitration Act 2025 proposal), § 23A(3)(b).
[27] International Bar Association, IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2014), General Standard.
[28] Cour de cassation, 1re civ., 19 décembre 2018, n° 16-18.349, Dalloz actualité, 1 février 2019 (obs. C. Debourg) ; ibid., 29 janvier 2019 ; J. Jourdan-Marques, D. 2019, p. 24 ; ibid. p. 2435 (obs. T. Clay) ; Procédures 2019, n° 4, p. 14 (obs. L. Weiller) ; JCP E 2019, n° 15, p. 20 (note A. Constans) ; Rev. arb. 2020, p. 403 (note M. Henry).
[29] Groupe de travail sur la réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage op. cit, p. 32.
[30] Groupe de travail sur la réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage op. cit, p. 51-52.
[31] https://www.adr.org/press-releases/aaa-icdr-to-launch-ai-native-arbitrator-transforming-dispute-resolution/.