On February 18, 2026, following an ex officio investigation launched in July 2024,[1] the French Competition Authority (the “FCA”) issued its Opinion No. 26-A-02 (the “Opinion”) on competition in the online video content creation sector in France.[2]  The Opinion identifies several areas of concern in the sector, including creators’ dependence on a small number of platforms, algorithmic opacity, bargaining-power imbalances with commercial partners, and the competitive implications of generative AI.  It calls on platforms to ensure fair and transparent revenue-sharing conditions, provide greater transparency on recommendation algorithms and content moderation measures, and make available dedicated contact points for creators.

Background

The FCA describes the online video content sector as a multi-sided market connecting online video creators, audiences, and advertisers through online platforms.[3]  These groups are inherently interdependent: platforms need attractive content to draw audiences and advertising revenue; creators rely on platforms for hosting, audience reach, and monetization; and advertisers depend on the audiences attracted by content on those platforms to place their advertisements.[4]

Figure 1: Overview of the Online Video Content Supply Chain

Source: the Opinion.[5]

Over the past 15 years, online video content creation has become as significant part of the French audiovisual industry, generating an estimated EUR 6.8 billion in France in 2025 and projected to reach EUR 31.3 billion by 2032.  These figures relate to the content creation ecosystem as a whole, encompassing for example, revenue generated by commercial partners, and are not specific to video content creation.[6]  The sector’s rapid growth has been driven by exceptionally low barriers to entry, with smartphones and accessible production tools making it possible for almost anyone to become a creator, and through the development of monetization mechanisms, including platform revenue-sharing and brand partnerships.[7]  This monetization has intensified competition among creators, enabling some to generate revenues significant enough to bring them within the scope of competition law as economic undertakings.[8]

The sector is also subject to an increasingly dense regulatory framework, including the Digital Markets Act (the “DMA”)[9] and the Digital Services Act (the “DSA”)[10] on the platform side, and France’s influencers Law (Loi influenceurs)[11] on the content-supply side.

Competition Between Online Video Creators on Two Levels

The FCA finds that competition among creators on online platforms plays out on two levels: (i) competition for audiences and (ii) competition for commercial partnerships.

  • Competition for audiences.[12]  Online video creators compete to capture and retain viewers’ attention.  As most online content is offered free of charge, competition is driven primarily by non-price parameters such as production quality, editorial identity, publication frequency, community engagement, and multichannel presence.[13]  In practice, however, visibility heavily depends on recommendation algorithms, which approximately 90% of surveyed content creators consider decisive for a video’s success.[14]  The inner workings of these algorithms remain opaque, creating uncertainty for creators over the factors that determine their reach and competitive position.[15]  Moreover, established creators may benefit from network effects – a so-called “audience spiral” – whereby greater algorithmic visibility allows them to generate higher revenues that they reinvest in content production, which in turn further strengthens their visibility and widens the gap with smaller creators.[16]
  • Competition for commercial partnerships.[17]  Commercial partnerships not only generate immediate revenue for creators, but also confer reputational capital, as collaborations with coveted brands signal credibility to audiences and advertisers alike.[18]  A creator’s attractiveness to a brand depends on audience size (reach), audience quality (engagement metrics), and fit between the creator’s content and the advertiser’s target demographic.[19]  Price is also a competitive parameter, as smaller creators in particular accept unpaid partnerships, foregoing compensation in exchange for the exposure a brand association provides.[20] 

These two levels of competition are mutually reinforcing.  A larger audience makes a creator more attractive to brands, which generates more partnership opportunities.  Those partnerships, in turn, enhance the creator’s profile and further expand their audience.[21]  Therefore, in practice, competition for audiences and brand partnerships operate as two sides of the same coin.

Unbalanced Bargaining Power in Favor of Commercial Partners

With the exception of the most prominent creators, the FCA finds that commercial partners, who sponsor creators in exchange for promotional content, generally enjoy superior bargaining power.[22]  The Opinion identifies a number of practices that reflect this imbalance, such as unpaid partnerships presented as exposure opportunities, non-negotiable rate cards, uncompensated transfers of intellectual property rights, exclusivity and non-compete clauses, and protracted payment terms.[23]  This imbalance is compounded by an information asymmetry as many online video creators, particularly those less experienced, lack a clear understanding of the legal framework governing their contracts, leaving them ill-equipped to push back against unfavorable terms.[24]  

Unbalanced Bargaining Power in Favor of Online Platforms

Platforms supply a triple service of hosting, audience access and monetization that creators cannot replicate, making recourse to a platform unavoidable.[25]  This dependency is reinforced by the concentration of the sector around a small number of major platforms (YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, and, to a lesser extent, Twitch), that are not easily substitutable as migrating to a competing platform typically means rebuilding an audience from scratch, a prospect that even prominent creators find prohibitively costly.[26]  The Opinion indicates that the result is a structural dependence and a profound imbalance of bargaining power in favor of the platforms.

The Opinion explains that structural dependence of online video creators on online platforms primarily arises in two ways:

  • Unilateral pricing power (revenue conditions).[27]  Platforms set monetization rules determining both whether a revenue-sharing mechanism exists and the applicable rates.[28]  The FCA notes that at Twitch, TikTok, and YouTube in particular, remuneration policies are applied  with little or no room for individual negotiation, even for the most high-profile creators.[29]  Access to monetization is conditional on meeting audience and activity thresholds set by the platforms at their sole discretion.[30] 
  • Unilateral algorithmic power (visibility conditions).[31]  Perhaps even more consequential is the platforms’ unilateral control over the algorithmic parameters that determine which content is recommended, surfaced, or buried.[32]  Algorithm changes may significantly affect a creator’s reach, yet creators often have limited visibility over the reasons for such changes and limited ability to challenge them.[33]  This results in an environment where a creator’s competitive position depends less on the quality of their content than on opaque algorithmic decisions whose parameters may change abruptly.[34]

    This opacity gives rise to serious risks of self-preferencing and discrimination by major platforms, as it obscures whether recommendation or moderation rules are applied on neutral and equitable terms. [35]  In particular, platforms could use algorithms to favor content created with the platform’s integrated tools – including generative AI tools – or to promote more popular, and therefore more lucrative content, thereby reducing the diversity of content available to consumers.[36]  They could also de-prioritize content involving brand partnerships in order to steer creators to purchase advertising space directly.[37] 

The FCAs Recommendations

The Opinion sets out several recommendations aimed at reducing the competitive risks identified in the online video content creation sector.[38]  The recommendations are directed primarily at platforms, which the FCA calls upon to ensure fair and transparent revenue-sharing conditions, provide greater transparency on recommendation algorithms and content moderation measures, and make available dedicated contact points to help creators understand drops in visibility or moderation decisions.[39]  The FCA further encourages creators to make full use of their existing rights and urges professional organizations, such as the UMICC (Union des Métiers de l’Influence et des Créateurs de Contenu), to step up their training and support efforts.[40]

Moreover, the FCA emphasizes that the growing use of generative AI in online video content production could fundamentally alter market dynamics in the sector.  By lowering production costs and enabling the mass production of online video content, generative AI may lower the barriers to entry that will enable smaller creators to compete with rivals that have significantly greater investment capacity.[41]  The FCA therefore stresses the need to ensure clear and reliable identification of AI-generated content.[42]

Conclusion

The Opinion highlights the FCA’s continued focus on digital markets and signals that, going forward, it will closely monitor the role of algorithms, platform monetization rules, and generative AI in shaping competition in this sector.  Notably, it highlights that existing ex ante regulations, including the DMA, the DSA or France’s influencers Law, do not adequately address the bargaining power imbalances and competitive risks that currently exist online video content creation sector, suggesting that further regulatory scrutiny in this area should be expected.

[1] FCA, Press release “The Autorité starts ex officio inquiry into the online video content creation sector in France and launches a public consultation”, July 10, 2024, available here.

[2] FCA, Press release “Avis 26-A-02 du 18 février 2026 relatif au fonctionnement de la concurrence dans le secteur de la création de contenu vidéo en ligne en France” (in French), February 18, 2026, available here.  The full Opinion is available here (in French).

[3] The Opinion, paras. 185-186.

[4] Ibidi.

[5] The Opinion, para. 27.

[6] The Opinion, para. 28.

[7] The Opinion, paras. 12-16.

[8] The Opinion, para. 17

[9] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act).

[10] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).

[11] Law No. 2023-451 of June 9, 2023, aimed at regulating commercial influence and combating misconduct by influencers on social networks, available here. The law notably includes transparency obligations, prohibited promotional practices, and contractual protections for content creators.

[12] The Opinion, paras. 194-248.

[13] The Opinion, para. 197.

[14] The Opinion, para. 217.

[15] The Opinion, para. 221.

[16] The Opinion, para. 244.  This term was already used by the FCA in the free-to-air television sector in its decision of January 2010 regarding the acquisition of NT1 and Monte-Carlo Participations (AB Group) by TF1 Group.  Decision No. 10-DCC-11 of January 26, 2010, concerning the acquisition of sole control by the TF1 group over NT1 and Monte-Carlo Participations (AB Group), para. 559.

[17] The Opinion, paras. 249-270.

[18] The Opinion, para. 250.

[19] The Opinion, para. 251.

[20] The Opinion, para. 252.

[21] The Opinion, paras. 193, 250, and 255.

[22] The Opinion, paras. 260-262.

[23] The Opinion, para. 263.

[24] The Opinion, para. 264.

[25] The Opinion, para. 326.

[26] The Opinion, paras. 328, 346-349, and 376-379.

[27] The Opinion, paras. 400-412

[28] The Opinion, paras. 400-401.

[29] The Opinion, paras. 403-408.

[30] The Opinion, paras. 407-408.

[31] The Opinion, paras. 413-425.

[32] The Opinion, paras. 413-414.

[33] The Opinion, paras. 415-416.

[34] The Opinion, paras. 413-417.

[35] The Opinion, paras. 420-421.

[36] The Opinion, paras. 421-424.

[37] The Opinion, para. 425.

[38] The Opinion, para. 429.

[39] The Opinion, paras. 430-433.

[40] The Opinion, para. 264.

[41] The Opinion, paras. 297-298 and 303-304.

[42] The Opinion, paras. 313-314.