The Ninth Circuit has now refused to revisit one of the most closely watched religious accommodation decisions to come out of the pandemic-era litigation wave. In Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, the court left standing a panel decision that held the plaintiff did not adequately plead a bona fide religious conflict with her employer’s COVID-19 testing policy.

For employers, the decision is a reminder that courts will continue to scrutinize religious accommodation claims at the pleading stage. For employees, it highlights a growing split in how courts evaluate whether an asserted objection is religious, secular, or some combination of both.

On April 15, 2026, the Ninth Circuit denied both panel rehearing and rehearing en banc in Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center. The underlying panel majority had affirmed dismissal of a Title VII religious-discrimination claim tied to an Oregon healthcare employer’s COVID-19 vaccine-and-testing policy.

The majority concluded that the plaintiff failed to allege a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with the employer’s testing requirement. The court’s analysis turned in part on its view that the plaintiff’s objection was driven by secular medical and scientific concerns rather than religion alone.

The dissents from denial of rehearing en banc are the real signal here. Judges Forrest and Tung, joined by multiple judges, argued that the panel majority went too far by parsing religious and secular motivations in a way that risks judging belief itself.

That criticism is significant because it cuts to a recurring issue in religious accommodation litigation: how much skepticism can a court apply before it starts second-guessing the substance of religion rather than the sincerity of the employee’s belief. The dissents also emphasized that Title VII defines religion broadly and that overlapping secular considerations do not automatically strip a request of religious character.

This decision does not give employers a free pass to reject religious accommodation requests, but it does reinforce several defense themes. First, documentation matters: the more a request sounds like a medical, safety, or personal-preference objection, the stronger the employer’s argument may be at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Second, employers should still engage the interactive process carefully and evaluate whether an accommodation is reasonable or would create undue hardship. The Detwiler litigation shows that even where an employer wins on the pleadings, the case may generate lengthy appellate disputes and competing judicial views.

Third, healthcare employers and other highly regulated workplaces should expect close scrutiny when policies involve testing, vaccination, PPE, or direct patient-facing risks. Those settings tend to create the hardest line-drawing problems, especially when an employee invokes prayer, conscience, or bodily integrity in addition to secular concerns.

The more important story may be the broader split developing across circuits. The dissents point to other appellate decisions taking a more permissive approach to religious accommodation pleadings, especially where the employee alleges that a faith-based view of the body or conscience shaped the objection.

That means this issue is unlikely to settle soon. Employers should assume that religious accommodation claims will continue to turn on carefully pleaded facts, the nature of the policy at issue, and the circuit in which the case is brought.

For California employers, the lesson is straightforward: do not assume that a request is religious just because it uses religious language, and do not assume it is secular just because the employee references science, medicine, or personal safety. The better approach is to analyze the request as presented, document the employer’s response, and evaluate whether the accommodation can be granted without undue hardship.